Post by Figgles on May 30, 2022 20:50:27 GMT
Rather than using the precise term "there is no volition," I prefer to say, the question of personal free will/volition is ultimately, misconceived...that said, the term had come up and likely will continue to get used.
If there is no actual separate entity, then what/who would it be that has it's own personal freedom to decide/act/behave?
Ouroboros posted this on ST and it's a great launching pad to talk further of this:
All appearing characters have an apparent ability to act in a way that is different from how they acted in the past or how they acted now. To engage that appearance is different than engaging one as if they have absolute, inherent, personal volition to simply change their behavior because someone else suggested a different mode of action/behavior.
How could you know for sure that those who point to an absence of volition, "engaging in a fashion that indicates they believe the other truly has personal free/will volition," other than if they outright said, "You should change what you are doing and I know you can, so why haven't you done it" kind of thing.
I'd like to see some actual quotes where you "think" you are seeing a user "engage in a fashion that indicates they beleive" in the other's free will/volition.
This conversation dove-tails perfectly with Reef's assertions about walk/talk in those of us who argue against an absolute certain knowing that says appearing people, and all appearing things, are alive, conscious, having discrete, unique, individuated experience.
This idea that just because the emptiness of a particular appearance/idea has been seen, that therefore, that appearance/idea ceases to invoke engagement, is demonstrative of some gross misunderstandings about how realization/seeing through impacts experience.
Just because you think you see one addressing others as though there is absolute knowing behind the engagement with appearance, does not necessarily make that so.
Indeed some behaviors and actions DO change post SR, but some also, do not...not in an overt anyway that can be seen just by observing.
I think the issue lies with this particular term, "the ability to.."
What does that really mean? Built into the appearance of persons is an "apparent" ability to listen, hear, look, see, respond appropriately. Just because all of that is seen to be appearance only does not mean that as an appearance, it ceases to be engaged with.
Again, can you know for certain that just because I yell out to my daughter that the laundry is ready to be put in the dryer, and there's an expectation that upon yelling that out, it will be put in the dryer, that I therefore believe in the actuality of my daughter being a separate entity who therefore has the personal free will/volition to do that.
When the dream as a whole is seen as "empty"...to be not-separate, all one seamless movement, much of these supposed walk/talk issues resolve.
Now of course you can take it to that wider context and say that the 'no free willys' don't actually have any choice but to act like that themselves, in the larger context of predetermination as you put it. But it's odd though, right. Because it's a bit different from the 'whether you can know others are real are not' spiel. Because in that instance the position is that it can't actually be known whether or not others are real, and so in lieu of that they just act like others are real anyway. I.e. it's assumed to be the case but just can't unequivocally be known.
I don't use that term "real" now when talking about the inherent emptiness of all appearance, including appearing people. It confuses the issue. It's the entirety of the appearing world....arising story that is empty of it's own fundamental existence, people and their apparent experience, are not singled out to be any different than any other appearance...it's ALL empty of Truth...there is no deeper 'knowledge' to BE ascertained from 'an empty appearance,' beyond what appears...other than the abiding ground from which it arises.
The action of "choosing" per se, the behavhior or standing there, for example, at an ice-cream counter, himming and hawing over chocolate vs. vanilla and then arising at vanilla, is NOT "an illusion." That is what's happening in experience. Choosing IS experienced. What "no volition" is in reference to is the "actuality" of the inherent freedom for the appearing person TO freely, separately, absent interference from any other aspect, TO choose.
If it's all one singular movement, and the apparent person is itself merely an empty appearance, (there is no separate entity) then the fundamental Truth is that there is no-one/no-thing actually there, TO have free will/volitional choice.
In short, there's a difference between the experience of choosing and the actuality of freely choosing/having personal volition.
No. I disagree. That's not how I'd explain it all. It's your observation that is reading something in that isn't. You think/believe that in your observation of the exchange, you are observing an assignation of personal volition to the appearing other, when really, it's not there.
If you'd be so kind as to offer up a specific quote where you think that I or someone else has engaged another in a way that assumes they have free will/volition, that would be really helpful.
If there is no actual separate entity, then what/who would it be that has it's own personal freedom to decide/act/behave?
Ouroboros posted this on ST and it's a great launching pad to talk further of this:
This one's interesting as well. It's got me thinking about those who take the stance that there is no volitioning period. I've mentioned before that I see it as a position leads to walk/talk issues. Namely, as I witness those users engaging in a fashion that indicates on some level they believe the folks they're interacting with do actually have an ability to see or act differently.
All appearing characters have an apparent ability to act in a way that is different from how they acted in the past or how they acted now. To engage that appearance is different than engaging one as if they have absolute, inherent, personal volition to simply change their behavior because someone else suggested a different mode of action/behavior.
How could you know for sure that those who point to an absence of volition, "engaging in a fashion that indicates they believe the other truly has personal free/will volition," other than if they outright said, "You should change what you are doing and I know you can, so why haven't you done it" kind of thing.
I'd like to see some actual quotes where you "think" you are seeing a user "engage in a fashion that indicates they beleive" in the other's free will/volition.
This conversation dove-tails perfectly with Reef's assertions about walk/talk in those of us who argue against an absolute certain knowing that says appearing people, and all appearing things, are alive, conscious, having discrete, unique, individuated experience.
This idea that just because the emptiness of a particular appearance/idea has been seen, that therefore, that appearance/idea ceases to invoke engagement, is demonstrative of some gross misunderstandings about how realization/seeing through impacts experience.
Just because you think you see one addressing others as though there is absolute knowing behind the engagement with appearance, does not necessarily make that so.
Indeed some behaviors and actions DO change post SR, but some also, do not...not in an overt anyway that can be seen just by observing.
I mean, have the ability to be able to look and see what's being told to them (pointed to) and to follow the advice. To get with the programme as it were. And make no mistake those aforementioned users routinely do act like that and I'm pretty sure don't deny it.
I think the issue lies with this particular term, "the ability to.."
What does that really mean? Built into the appearance of persons is an "apparent" ability to listen, hear, look, see, respond appropriately. Just because all of that is seen to be appearance only does not mean that as an appearance, it ceases to be engaged with.
Again, can you know for certain that just because I yell out to my daughter that the laundry is ready to be put in the dryer, and there's an expectation that upon yelling that out, it will be put in the dryer, that I therefore believe in the actuality of my daughter being a separate entity who therefore has the personal free will/volition to do that.
When the dream as a whole is seen as "empty"...to be not-separate, all one seamless movement, much of these supposed walk/talk issues resolve.
Now of course you can take it to that wider context and say that the 'no free willys' don't actually have any choice but to act like that themselves, in the larger context of predetermination as you put it. But it's odd though, right. Because it's a bit different from the 'whether you can know others are real are not' spiel. Because in that instance the position is that it can't actually be known whether or not others are real, and so in lieu of that they just act like others are real anyway. I.e. it's assumed to be the case but just can't unequivocally be known.
I don't use that term "real" now when talking about the inherent emptiness of all appearance, including appearing people. It confuses the issue. It's the entirety of the appearing world....arising story that is empty of it's own fundamental existence, people and their apparent experience, are not singled out to be any different than any other appearance...it's ALL empty of Truth...there is no deeper 'knowledge' to BE ascertained from 'an empty appearance,' beyond what appears...other than the abiding ground from which it arises.
However, when it comes to the proponents of no-volition, it's actually stated that they do know that there is no volition, and unequivocally so. That it's been directly seen to be the case, realised. Yet, as 'an expression that unfolds' they continue to talk to others as if choice is not merely an illusion.
The action of "choosing" per se, the behavhior or standing there, for example, at an ice-cream counter, himming and hawing over chocolate vs. vanilla and then arising at vanilla, is NOT "an illusion." That is what's happening in experience. Choosing IS experienced. What "no volition" is in reference to is the "actuality" of the inherent freedom for the appearing person TO freely, separately, absent interference from any other aspect, TO choose.
If it's all one singular movement, and the apparent person is itself merely an empty appearance, (there is no separate entity) then the fundamental Truth is that there is no-one/no-thing actually there, TO have free will/volitional choice.
In short, there's a difference between the experience of choosing and the actuality of freely choosing/having personal volition.
And so I guess (in that larger context) it must be considered by them that, that's just the way it's happening. That 'THIS' is just doing its thing and that's the way it just happens to be unfolding. Which for some reason, in its entirety, is taking on the characteristic of a seemingly rather contradictory expression where it's simultaneously directly known that volition is an illusion, and yet clearly and tangibly implied that it's not, albeit only by subtle inference.
No. I disagree. That's not how I'd explain it all. It's your observation that is reading something in that isn't. You think/believe that in your observation of the exchange, you are observing an assignation of personal volition to the appearing other, when really, it's not there.
If you'd be so kind as to offer up a specific quote where you think that I or someone else has engaged another in a way that assumes they have free will/volition, that would be really helpful.
